A customer falls in your store. A company vehicle is involved in a collision. A tractor-trailer is in a serious crash. An employee causes injury while on the job. Regardless of the setting, whether premises, auto, or trucking, the legal analysis begins with the same three questions: Are we legally responsible? What must we do immediately to protect the defense? What is our realistic exposure? The answers to these questions are rarely simple. But how they are analyzed in the first days of a claim often determines how the case ultimately resolves. 1.           Are We Legally Responsible? Legal responsibility in Texas is not automatic simply because an injury occurred. Premises Liability In a slip-and-fall or property defect case, a plaintiff must generally establish: ·        The existence of an unreasonably dangerous condition ·        The owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the condition ·        Failure to exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk ·        Proximate cause The notice requirement alone can be dispositive. Constructive notice requires proof that the condition existed long enough that it should have been discovered through reasonable inspection. Without that showing, liability fails regardless of injury severity. Additionally, issues such as: ·        Open and obvious conditions ·        Commonplace or minor defects ·        Lack of foreseeability can materially limit exposure. Motor Vehicle and Trucking Accidents In auto and commercial trucking cases, the analysis is more extensive. Key questions include: ·        Was the driver negligent? ·        Was the driver acting within the course and scope of employment? ·        Is there potential vicarious liability? ·        Are independent contractor issues implicated? ·        Is there a negligent entrustment or supervision claim? In trucking cases, regulatory compliance can become central. Alleged violations of: ·        Hours-of-service rules ·        Driver qualification standards ·        Maintenance regulations are often used to attempt to elevate ordinary negligence into a “corporate negligence” narrative. However, regulatory allegations do not automatically establish liability. They must still be tied to proximate cause. Comparative Responsibility Texas follows proportionate responsibility principles. Even where a business bears some fault, liability may be reduced by: ·        Plaintiff negligence ·        Third-party fault ·        Unavoidable accident circumstances The legal inquiry is fact-intensive, and early assumptions are dangerous. 2.           What Must We Do Immediately? The first 24–72 hours after an incident are critical. Courts increasingly scrutinize evidence preservation. Failure to preserve key evidence can lead to: ·        Spoliation instructions ·        Adverse inference arguments ·        Credibility damage ·        Increased settlement pressure Evidence Preservation Depending on the type of case, preservation may include: Premises cases ·        Surveillance footage ·        Incident reports ·        Inspection logs ·        Cleaning schedules ·        Maintenance records Motor vehicle / trucking cases ·        Dash camera footage ·        Event data recorder information ·        Electronic logging device (ELD) data ·        Driver qualification files ·        Drug and alcohol testing documentation ·        Maintenance records Preservation is not merely best practice — it is often a legal obligation once litigation is reasonably anticipated. Insurance Notification Most commercial policies contain notice provisions. Delayed reporting can create coverage disputes or complicate defense strategy. Prompt and accurate reporting allows: ·        Early claim evaluation ·        Assignment of counsel ·        Coordinated investigation Internal Communications Informal emails, texts, and speculative statements can become exhibits at trial. Businesses should: ·        Limit incident communications to designated personnel ·        Avoid admissions or fault assessments before investigation ·        Instruct employees not to discuss incidents publicly In today’s litigation climate, the defense often begins before the petition is even filed. 3.           What Is Our Realistic Exposure? In the immediate aftermath of a serious incident, businesses often jump to worst-case scenarios, particularly in an era of widely publicized “nuclear verdicts.” But exposure analysis requires discipline. It is not driven by headlines. It is driven by facts, liability strength, injury severity, venue, and insurance structure. Damages Begin With Compensation Most injury claims seek compensatory damages, which may include: Medical expenses (past and future) Lost wages or lost earning capacity Physical impairment Pain and suffering The severity of injury matters. But it does not control the outcome on its own. A catastrophic injury with weak liability may present less practical risk than a moderate injury with clear fault in an unfavorable venue. Exposure is always a function of both damages and defensibility. The Role of Punitive (Exemplary) Damages When media reports reference large verdicts, punitive damages are often part of the narrative. In Texas, punitive damages — also called exemplary damages — are not intended to compensate an injured party. They are intended to punish and deter. They require proof, by clear and convincing evidence, of more than ordinary negligence. A plaintiff must establish gross negligence, malice, or fraud. Gross negligence requires: An extreme degree of risk, and Actual, subjective awareness of that risk coupled with conscious indifference. That is a significantly higher threshold than simple carelessness. In trucking and commercial vehicle cases, plaintiffs frequently attempt to frame routine accidents as systemic safety failures. Alleged regulatory violations, hiring decisions, or maintenance practices are often used to support punitive claims. But regulatory noncompliance alone does not automatically establish gross negligence. The conduct must rise to the level of conscious disregard for safety. Texas law also imposes statutory caps on exemplary damages in most cases, limiting potential recovery under defined formulas. Punitive claims can expand discovery, increase settlement pressure, and complicate insurance analysis. However, they remain the exception rather than the rule. Insurance Limits and Excess Risk A realistic exposure analysis also requires evaluating: Primary policy limits Umbrella or excess coverage Indemnity agreements Contractual risk transfer provisions In commercial vehicle cases, especially, excess verdict risk depends on multiple aligned factors: Clear liability Catastrophic injury Adverse venue Damaging internal communications Poor compliance documentation Without those converging elements, worst-case outcomes are often less likely than initial fear suggests. Exposure Is a Legal and Strategic Assessment Financial exposure is not determined on the day of the accident. It evolves as facts develop. Early investigation, disciplined communication, evidence preservation, and accurate liability assessment significantly influence how exposure is perceived by: Plaintiffs’ counsel Insurance carriers Mediators Jurors A measured, legally grounded evaluation often replaces anxiety with clarity. Ordinary negligence is not enough. In trucking cases, plaintiffs frequently attempt to frame routine accidents as systemic safety failures. Whether the facts support that narrative is a separate question. Insurance Limits and Excess Risk Policy limits, umbrella coverage, and indemnity agreements can significantly affect financial exposure. In commercial vehicle cases, especially, excess verdict risk depends on: ·        Clear liability ·        Catastrophic injury ·        Adverse venue ·        Inflammatory internal communications ·        Weak compliance documentation Exposure is a function of risk factors — not headlines. The Common Thread Across premises liability, auto collisions, and trucking claims, successful defense typically turns on: ·        Early factual development ·        Evidence preservation ·        Accurate liability assessment ·        Disciplined internal response ·        Strategic litigation management Accidents happen. What distinguishes manageable claims from high-risk litigation is not the incident itself — it is how the business responds in the days and weeks that follow. A Structured Response Is Not Optional In today’s litigation environment, serious injury claims do not resolve themselves. Plaintiffs’ counsel evaluate cases immediately for leverage , including venue, injury severity, regulatory issues, and internal communications, all of which become part of the narrative. Businesses should approach potential claims with the same discipline. The early questions — liability, preservation, and exposure — are not abstract legal issues. They are strategic inflection points. Decisions made in the first days after an incident can determine whether a case is defensible on summary judgment, manageable through early resolution, or positioned for trial. A measured and legally grounded response protects more than a single claim. It protects the organization’s credibility, insurance relationships, and long-term litigation posture. Accidents may be unavoidable. Escalation often is not. When a serious incident occurs, whether on your premises or on the road, clarity, documentation, and strategic legal guidance are not reactionary steps. They are essential components of responsible risk management.

By Zeke Moya, Partner at Roerig, Oliveira & Fisher, LLP Texas Embraces Early Dismissal: A New Era in Litigation Before 2013, Texas civil litigation lacked an efficient mechanism to dismiss baseless claims early in a case. Motions to dismiss were limited. Consequently, parties often endured lengthy discovery and a full summary judgment process before they could challenge meritless pleadings. Out-of-state clients, accustomed to Federal Rule 12(b)(6), frequently expressed disbelief at this inefficiency. This landscape changed with the adoption of Rule 91a. This rule provides a streamlined procedure for dismissing claims that lack a basis in law or fact. Initially, it was underutilized due to mandatory fee-shifting and limited case law. However, after 12 years of appellate interpretation and a critical 2019 amendment that made fee awards discretionary, Rule 91a has gained traction. At the same time, summary judgment remains the dominant tool for resolving disputes on the merits, especially when factual development is necessary. As of January 1, 2024, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a was amended to require courts to rule on summary judgment motions within 75 days of filing. This amendment represents a significant step toward procedural efficiency. This article compares Rule 91a and summary judgment—both powerful tools when deployed properly—and outlines how attorneys can strategically use them to narrow or eliminate claims. Understanding the Tools: Rule 91a and Summary Judgment Rule 91a: A Pure Pleadings Test Rule 91a allows for dismissal when a cause of action lacks any basis in law or fact. The court assumes the truth of all factual allegations but does not defer to legal conclusions. If the pleaded facts—even taken as true—do not entitle the plaintiff to relief, the claim is dismissed. Similarly, if the facts alleged are objectively unbelievable, the court may dismiss on “no basis in fact” grounds. Importantly, Rule 91a is strictly confined to the four corners of the plaintiff’s petition and any documents properly attached under Rule 59. The court cannot consider evidence, and any motion relying on facts outside the pleadings will be denied. Affirmative defenses can support dismissal only if they are conclusively established on the face of the petition itself. This mechanism provides defendants a way to challenge legal insufficiency without discovery, delay, or evidentiary dispute. Summary Judgment: Evidence Rules the Day In contrast, summary judgment evaluates whether genuine fact issues require a trial. Traditional summary judgment under Rule 166a(c) allows a party to present evidence—affidavits, depositions, interrogatory responses, and business records—to prove entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. No-evidence summary judgment under Rule 166a(i) flips the burden. After adequate discovery, the movant may argue there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of the opposing party’s claim. The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce competent summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Unlike Rule 91a, summary judgment is fundamentally fact-driven and almost always follows discovery. Timing Rules and the New 75-Day Deadline Rule 91a: Tight Windows for Quick Disposition Rule 91a imposes several strict procedural deadlines: The motion must be filed within 60 days after service of the challenged pleading. The hearing must be set at least 21 days after the motion is filed. The court “must” rule within 45 days—although this deadline is considered directory , not jurisdictional. Failure to rule does not result in automatic denial. Importantly, the respondent may amend the petition or nonsuit the challenged cause of action at least three days before the hearing, avoiding both a ruling and potential exposure to attorney’s fees. Summary Judgment: Now Bound by a Ruling Deadline Effective September 1, 2025, Texas trial courts will be required by law to rule on summary judgment motions within specific statutory deadlines. Under Senate Bill 293, codified in the Texas Government Code, trial courts must: Hear or consider a motion for summary judgment within 45 days after the response is filed. Issue a written ruling within 90 days after that hearing or submission date. These deadlines are mandatory and apply in district courts, statutory county courts, and the newly created Texas Business Courts. They aim to eliminate the long-standing problem of summary judgment motions lingering unresolved—sometimes for months or even years—and to create greater transparency and accountability. Clerks must track compliance, and the Office of Court Administration (OCA) will publish annual compliance reports. In tandem with this statutory overhaul, the Texas Supreme Court has proposed a complete rewrite of Rule 166a, with changes expected to take effect by March 1, 2026. While the revised rule does not alter the substantive standards for summary judgment, it will modernize structure and language, clarify procedural expectations, and align with the new statutory timing requirements. Public comment is open through February 28, 2026, and final adoption is expected shortly thereafter. These changes significantly shift the strategic landscape. Litigators must now carefully consider when to file dispositive motions to ensure they obtain rulings before trial. Courts, for their part, are under increased pressure to issue timely and documented decisions. The upshot: summary judgment is no longer just a pretrial tool—it is now a time-sensitive, data-tracked, and administratively monitored part of Texas civil practice. Attorney’s Fees: One Shifts, One Doesn’t Rule 91a: Discretionary Fee-Shifting with Teeth One of the most impactful aspects of Rule 91a is the potential for attorney’s fee recovery. While the rule originally required mandatory fee awards for the prevailing party, the 2019 amendment to Rule 91a.7 now gives trial courts discretion to award “all costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred” with respect to the challenged cause of action. This creates both opportunity and risk. Movants who prevail in dismissing claims may recover fees, but they must provide evidence that meets the standard articulated in Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP , 578 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. 2019). This includes time records, hourly rates, and justification under the lodestar method. Nonmovants may be awarded fees if they prevail on a Rule 91a motion. This discourages defendants from filing weak or speculative motions. However, if a claim is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, courts generally do not award fees, as such dismissals are not rulings on the merits. Parties can avoid fee exposure by narrowing the issues through a nonsuit or motion withdrawal at least three days before the hearing. Summary Judgment: No Fees Unless Provided by Law Summary judgment does not include any built-in fee-shifting mechanism. A party may recover attorney’s fees only if: A contract authorizes fee recovery. A statute (such as the DTPA or CPRC § 38.001) provides for fees. Or the case is brought under the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act, and the court exercises its discretion to award fees. Winning summary judgment alone does not entitle a party to attorney’s fees unless those underlying bases exist. Strategic Use: When and Why to File Rule 91a: Fast, Focused, and Tactical Rule 91a is ideal when the plaintiff’s pleading is legally deficient on its face or when the claim is clearly barred—such as by limitations, lack of standing, or preemption—without needing discovery. It is especially useful when the defendant wants to apply early pressure, trigger a re-plead, or potentially shift fees. However, because the court may deny the motion and award fees, it should be used only when the legal deficiency is clear and undisputed. Summary Judgment: The Workhorse of Texas Litigation Summary judgment remains the standard tool for resolving fact-driven disputes or eliminating claims that cannot survive the evidentiary burden. It is especially appropriate when: Discovery has revealed a fatal weakness. An affirmative defense requires extrinsic proof. You want to frame trial issues narrowly or obtain pretrial leverage. With the new 75-day ruling deadline , summary judgment is also more efficient than ever. Final Thoughts: Use Both — Intelligently Rule 91a and summary judgment are not alternatives—they are complementary tools. One attacks the pleading, while the other attacks the proof. Used together, they can: Save months of litigation. Reduce discovery costs. Create early settlement leverage. And now, with the new court deadlines, we can deliver faster results. Texas litigators who understand how and when to deploy Rule 91a or summary judgment—especially in tandem—can control the tempo and scope of litigation from day one. Need help evaluating a Rule 91a motion or planning a dispositive strategy in a complex case? Reach out. We’ve successfully deployed both tools across industries and venues throughout Texas.

By Zeke Moya, Partner at Roerig, Oliveira & Fisher, LLP Premises liability cases frequently turn on whether the plaintiff can establish that the condition was “unreasonably dangerous.” Two recent Texas Supreme Court opinions— United Supermarkets, LLC v. McIntire , 646 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. 2022), and Pay & Save, Inc. v. Canales , 691 S.W.3d 499 (Tex. 2024) have sharpened that inquiry in a way that strongly favors landowners and retailers confronting claims involving everyday surface irregularities. Together, these cases reinforce Texas's common condition doctrine : the principle that ordinary, ubiquitous conditions, those encountered and avoided daily through common sense, are not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law. But the Court has also signaled limits. In McIntire , the Court cautioned that it was making “no broad pronouncements” about pavement defects generally. And Canales  frames its holding through the lens of the specific condition at issue. So how far does this defense extend—particularly to potholes, sidewalks, and roadway conditions? Let’s break it down. 1. The Legal Framework: “Unreasonably Dangerous” Requires More Than a Possibility of Harm To prevail on a premises liability claim, a plaintiff must prove that the owner had knowledge of a condition that was unreasonably dangerous, failed to exercise reasonable care, and proximately caused injury. The critical battleground is often element two. In McIntire , the plaintiff tripped over a ¾-inch divot in a grocery store parking lot. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the defect was not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law. The Court emphasized: The divot was small and “profoundly ordinary.” It had generated no prior complaints or injuries. Surface irregularities in pavement are ubiquitous. Landowners are not insurers of invitee safety . In Canales , the Court doubled down. A customer caught his foot in the open side of a wooden pallet used to display watermelons. Despite a multi-million-dollar jury verdict, the Court rendered a take-nothing judgment, holding that the pallet was not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law. Crucially, Canales  articulates the doctrine clearly: Common or innocuous hazards are not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law. The standalone fact that a condition has caused an injury does not make it unreasonably dangerous . The Court warned against hindsight-based liability and reiterated that the “mere possibility of harm” is insufficient. 2. The Commonplace Condition Doctrine in Parking Lot Pothole Cases A. Small Pavement Defects McIntire  is the most direct pothole case. The Texas Supreme Court evaluated: Size (less than one inch deep) Lack of prior incidents No distinguishing features from other minor pavement defects Natural, ubiquitous formation of such irregularities The Court concluded that tiny surface defects are expected features of parking lots and that invitees are generally aware of them. This significantly strengthens summary judgment arguments in cases involving: Minor potholes Shallow depressions Small cracks or divots Gradual elevation changes Defense strategy now centers on demonstrating ordinariness, ubiquity, and absence of prior incidents. 3. What Canales  Adds: Industry Practice and the Absence of Transforming Circumstances Canales  extends the doctrine beyond pavement defects to retail display conditions. The Court emphasized: No evidence of prior complaints or injuries at this store. No regulatory violations. The practice was widely accepted and long-used in the industry . Expert testimony that something “could” cause injury does not establish unreasonable risk. Importantly, the Court required plaintiffs to show something that transforms   a common condition into one “measurably more likely to cause injury." For parking lot pothole cases, this means plaintiffs must now produce evidence such as: Prior documented falls Complaints or internal reports Code violations Evidence that the defect was unusually large or concealed Surrounding circumstances increase the risk Without that, the condition remains an everyday hazard. 4. Application Beyond Parking Lots: Sidewalks and Roadways A. Sidewalk Elevation Changes The reasoning in both cases readily extends to: Minor sidewalk height differentials Hairline cracks Naturally weathered surfaces Gradual slopes If the condition is small, common, and has not resulted in prior incidents, the commonplace condition defense is now a powerful tool. B. Roadway Conditions The doctrine may also apply to: Minor road depressions Routine wear-and-tear irregularities Naturally occurring surface deterioration The Court’s emphasis on ubiquity and natural formation in McIntire suggests that not every pavement irregularity gives rise to liability even where injury results. However, roadway cases may involve sovereign immunity or statutory frameworks that complicate direct application. 5. The Limiting Language: Is the Doctrine Narrow? Defense counsel should note the Court’s caution. In McIntire , the Court expressly stated that it was making “no broad pronouncements” about pavement defects generally. This language signals: Larger potholes may still create fact issues. Poor lighting or concealment could matter. Prior incidents could alter the analysis. Code violations may change the outcome. Similarly, Canales  rests heavily on the absence of evidence showing prior injuries, regulatory violations, or unusual circumstances . In other words, the commonplace condition defense is powerful but fact-dependent. 6. Strategic Takeaways for Premises Owners and Insurers Develop evidence of ordinariness.  Photographs, measurements, and comparisons to similar conditions are critical. Document inspections.  Evidence of routine inspection undermines claims of unreasonable risk. Investigate prior incidents.  The absence of prior complaints was decisive in both cases. Challenge expert testimony aggressively.  Both opinions make clear that testimony that something “could” cause injury is insufficient. Push for summary judgment.  These cases reaffirm that courts—not juries—can decide unreasonable danger as a matter of law. Conclusion: A Significant Shift in Parking Lot and Surface Defect Litigation McIntire  and Canales  represent a strong reaffirmation of the Texas Supreme Court’s resistance to turning landowners into insurers of visitor safety. Minor potholes, everyday surface defects, ordinary pallets, and ubiquitous conditions do not automatically create liability simply because someone was injured. The key question is no longer whether injury was possible, but whether the condition was sufficiently probable to cause harm that a reasonably prudent person would foresee it as likely. For parking lot pothole cases and potentially sidewalk and roadway claims, the commonplace condition defense is now one of the most important tools in a premises liability practitioner’s arsenal.

Ah, Christmas! That magical time of year when the air is filled with the aroma of fresh pine trees, gingerbread cookies, and, if you're in my line of work, the faint whiff of legal filings marked "URGENT." Yes, even during the most wonderful time of the year, the insurance claims, business disputes, and occasional bizarre lawsuits (looking at you, Santa vs. the HOA) don't take a holiday. But let's not dwell on the legal Grinch stealing our cheer. Instead, let’s embrace the season with all its festive quirks. Here are a few holiday observations from your friendly neighborhood insurance defense attorney: 1. Office Holiday Parties: A Legal Powder Keg Nothing says "Merry Christmas" quite like the annual office party—a joyous occasion that doubles as a potential liability minefield. Remember, just because someone brought spiked eggnog doesn’t mean your workplace policies take a vacation. And to my clients: if you’re hosting one, maybe don't hang mistletoe in HR’s line of sight? 2. Christmas Tree Fires and Other Seasonal Claims I can’t tell you how many cases I’ve seen start with, "We didn’t realize the lights had a short circuit." A friendly reminder: if your holiday décor looks like Clark Griswold had a hand in it, you might want to double-check your homeowner’s policy. Safety first, lawsuits last! 3. Santa Claus: The Original Risk Manager Think about it. Santa navigates icy roofs, wrangles unpredictable reindeer, and enters homes without setting off alarms. The man clearly has liability waivers for days! Also, can we talk about his incredible time management skills? If you’re reading this, Santa, call me. I could use your help with some trial calendars. 4. Family Gatherings: Free Legal Advice (But Not Really) This time of year, relatives love to corner me with "quick legal questions." Pro tip: If the answer starts with, "It depends," it’s probably not a quick question. Still, I’ll answer—as long as there’s brisket and tamales involved. (Mom, this does not include drafting Aunt Martha’s living will at the dinner table. Again.) 5. Thank You for Another Year All jokes aside, I’m incredibly grateful for the trust my clients place in me year-round. Whether you’re an insurance adjuster battling a tough claim, a business owner safeguarding your livelihood, or anyone else I’ve had the privilege to help, you’re the reason I love what I do—even when it means working through a bit of holiday chaos. So, from my family to yours—including my wife, kids, and our loyal office mascots, Thor the Boston terrier and Bruno the pug—Merry Christmas and Happy Holidays! May your season be filled with laughter, love, and hopefully no legal disputes (but if there are, you know where to find me). Cheers to a joyful and lawsuit-free New Year! -Zeke Moya

The Texas Legislature is considering two key bills, House Bill 1419 and House Bill 939, that could significantly impact personal injury litigation by placing limits on noneconomic damages. Both bills aim to curb the so-called “nuclear” verdict and provide predictability in damage awards, but they approach this issue differently. Below, I’ll break down each bill's content and compare their potential effects. Nuclear Verdicts in Texas According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform, Texas has emerged as a prominent state for nuclear verdicts, with a study identifying 130 cases totaling $16 billion in awards.[1] A nuclear verdict refers to an exceptionally high jury award in a civil lawsuit, typically involving amounts that significantly exceed what would be considered reasonable compensation based on the evidence or damages in the case. These verdicts often surpass $10 million and are most common in cases involving personal injury, wrongful death, or catastrophic damages. A significant factor behind these large verdicts is the use of anchoring techniques, where attorneys propose specific, often arbitrary figures for damages.[2] These strategies influence jurors’ perceptions, often resulting in higher awards.[3] For instance, in 2023, during a Texas automobile accident case, the plaintiff’s lawyer suggested calculating damages based on "two cents" per mile for every mile driven by the defendant company’s trucks, resulting in a $39 million jury award that closely aligned with the suggested figure.[4] The Texas Supreme Court later ordered a retrial, citing the use of "unsubstantiated anchors" and other improper practices as reasons for the decision.[5] Overview of HB 1419 House Bill 1419 introduces a tiered cap system for noneconomic damages in personal injury and wrongful death cases. The highlights are: For physical pain and suffering:  The cap is set at three times the economic damages awarded to the claimant. For mental or emotional anguish:  Two separate caps apply: $1 million if the primary injury is emotional. $250,000 if the primary injury is physical. Annual adjustment:  Starting January 1, 2027, these caps will increase annually by 1.75%. Single-defendant treatment:  All entities liable under vicarious liability are treated as one defendant for the purposes of applying these limits. Overview of HB 939 House Bill 939 takes a more straightforward approach by imposing a single cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury claims: Cap Amount:  The greater of: $5 million, or Five times the economic damages awarded to the claimant. Effective Date:  This cap would apply to cases filed on or after January 1, 2026. Comparison of the Bills Aspect HB 1419 HB 939 Basis for Caps Tied to specific types of damages and adjusted over time. Based on a fixed multiplier of economic damages or a flat amount. Maximum Cap Amount Variable, depending on economic damages; up to $1M for emotional injuries. $5 million or five times the economic damages. Annual Adjustments Caps increase by 1.75% annually starting in 2027. No provision for annual adjustments. Defendant Treatment All responsible entities treated as one for liability. Silent on this matter. Primary Goal Differentiated limits by damage type; cost predictability. Broad cap, designed for simplicity and uniformity. Potential Effects on Personal Injury Litigation Impact on Claimants: HB 1419’s tiered system may disproportionately affect cases involving significant noneconomic harm but limited economic damages. For example, claimants with severe emotional distress might receive lower awards unless tied to high economic costs. HB 939, by contrast, offers broader compensation for substantial noneconomic harm, though it caps extremely large awards. Effect on Insurers and Businesses: Both bills are likely to reduce exposure to large noneconomic damage awards. HB 1419 might offer greater predictability for insurers due to its annual adjustments and specific damage-type caps. HB 939 simplifies calculations, which could streamline risk assessment processes. Litigation Strategies: Attorneys may adjust their approaches under these laws, focusing on maximizing economic damages in HB 939 cases or tailoring evidence to fit HB 1419’s tiers. Conclusion Both bills represent an effort to curb “nuclear” verdicts by enacting caps to noneconomic damage awards, but they reflect different philosophies. HB 1419 emphasizes tailored caps based on damage types and gradual adjustment, while HB 939 provides a broader, fixed framework. As these proposals evolve, understanding their nuances will be crucial for insurers, businesses, and legal practitioners navigating the Texas personal injury landscape. Stay tuned for updates as the Texas Legislature debates these important measures. [1] “Which States Have the Most “Nuclear” Verdicts?,” U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform, July 11, 2024, https://instituteforlegalreform.com/blog/which-states-have-the-most-nuclear-verdicts/#:~:text=Texas%20is%20a%20leading%20state,tactics%20required%20a%20new%20trial . [2]  Id . [3]  Id . [4]  Id . [5]  Id .

As insurance professionals, staying ahead of legislative changes is critical to managing claims effectively and protecting your company’s bottom line. A newly proposed bill in the Texas legislature could significantly alter how personal injury and wrongful death cases are handled, with direct implications for claims departments and adjusters. Here’s what you need to know and how this could impact your role in claims management: Key Highlights of the Proposed Bill: Caps on Noneconomic Damages: Wrongful Death Cases:  Mental or emotional anguish damages capped at $1,000,000 . Personal Injury Cases:   Physical pain and suffering: The lesser of two times the awarded healthcare expenses  or $100,000 per year of life expectancy . Emotional injuries (e.g., sexual assault): Capped at $1,000,000 . Bodily injuries: Capped at $250,000 . These caps aim to reduce the unpredictability of noneconomic damages that often inflate settlement valuations. Affidavit Requirements for Healthcare Costs: Affidavits must include Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes  to substantiate reasonableness and necessity. Caps healthcare charges at 150% of the median amount paid by non-governmental third-party payors . Limits discovery related to healthcare costs unless specific conditions are met. Stronger Evidentiary Standards: Claims for physical pain and mental anguish must demonstrate a measurable, significant impact. Damages must show a direct and rational connection to the evidence presented. Changes to Attorney Fees and Discovery: Limits on plaintiff attorneys’ fees for healthcare expenses to one-third of amounts awarded . New disclosure requirements for letters of protection and healthcare provider relationships, adding transparency to claims. Jury and Appellate Changes: Requires juries to receive clearer instructions on damage awards. Appellate courts must provide detailed written opinions when reviewing damage awards. Implications for Insurance Adjusters and Claims Leaders: If passed, this bill will likely: Enhance Predictability:  Caps on noneconomic damages may help reduce runaway verdicts, making it easier to assess claims exposure accurately. Streamline Claims Evaluation:  With stricter standards for affidavits and disclosures, adjusters can more effectively evaluate the validity of claims. Reduce Litigation Costs:  Transparency requirements and fee caps could disincentivize overinflated healthcare costs and excessive litigation. Improve Defense Strategy:  With clearer definitions and limits, defense attorneys can more effectively argue against excessive claims. What Should Insurance Leaders Do Now? Monitor Progress:  Stay updated on this legislation’s status and potential amendments. Engage Legal Counsel:  Work closely with your defense attorneys to adjust settlement and trial strategies in anticipation of these changes. Review Internal Processes:  Align your claims handling procedures with the proposed legislation’s transparency and evidence requirements. Closing Thoughts: This proposed bill represents a pivotal moment for insurance defense in Texas. By reducing uncertainty and emphasizing evidence-based damages, the legislation could create a more balanced playing field for insurers. At Roerig, Oliveira, & Fisher, LLP, we support your team with insights and strategies to navigate these changes effectively. Let’s work together to protect your company’s interests and deliver results that reflect these new legal standards. Contact us today to discuss how we can tailor our approach to meet your needs. Zeke Moya Partner Email: zmoya@rofllp.com Ph.: 956.393.6300 10225 N. 10th Street McAllen, Texas 78504 #InsuranceDefense #LegislationUpdate #ClaimsManagement #TexasLaw

The Texas Supreme Court is reviewing the case of Maurice N. Leibman v. Cleveratta and James Waldroup, Individually and As Next Friends of R.W., a Minor (No. 23-0317; granted September 27, 2024). The Court has accepted the petition for review filed by the defendant physician, Dr. Leibman, challenging the Houston [1st] Court of Appeals' decision. This decision determined that Dr. Leibman's issuance of a letter to his patient concerning the suitability of a pit bull as a service animal did not constitute a healthcare liability claim. The Texas Supreme Court heard oral arguments in this case on December 5, 2024. The outcome may influence the interpretation of Chapter 74's scope, particularly regarding non-medical actions like issuing letters concerning service animals. Today, we explore the appellate court’s opinion and the arguments presented by both sides before the Texas Supreme Court. The Background of the Case Dr. Maurice N. Leibman, a gynecologist, provided letters for his former patient, Jennifer Romano, affirming that she needed service animals to manage her generalized anxiety disorder. Romano later used these letters to obtain fraudulent credentials for her dog, Kingston. Over a year after the doctor-patient relationship ended, Kingston, wearing a "service animal" vest, attacked and injured a child (R.W.) in a restaurant. The child’s parents, Cleveratta and James Waldroup, sued Dr. Leibman, alleging negligence and fraud in issuing these letters without verifying the dog’s qualifications. Dr. Leibman moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that they were HCLCs under the TMLA, requiring an expert report that the Waldroups failed to serve. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the appellate court upheld the trial court’s ruling. Thereafter, Dr. Leibman filed a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court. Procedural History 1.       Trial Court Dr. Leibman filed a Motion to Dismiss in the trial court because the claims against him constituted health care liability claims (HCLCs) under the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA). He argued that the Waldroups failed to serve him with the expert report required under Section 74.351(a) of the TMLA within the statutory 120-day deadline. The Waldroups argued that the claims were not HCLC and, alternatively, that Dr. Leibman waived his HCLC defense by failing to timely assert that the claims were HCLCs in his initial answer or disclosures under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194.2(b)(3). The trial court denied Dr. Liebman’s motion based on the substantive determination that the claims did not constitute HCLCs under the TMLA.     2.       Appellate Court The Texas 1st Court of Appeals ruled that the claims against Dr. Leibman were not HCLCs. The court reasoned that: The claims did not arise from Dr. Leibman’s medical care or treatment of Romano. His statements about the dog’s qualifications were unrelated to accepted standards of health care or safety integral to medical services. Expert testimony on medical standards was unnecessary to evaluate the claims. The appellate court did not specifically address whether Dr. Leibman had waived his HCLC defense under Chapter 74. Instead, the court focused on determining whether the claims met the statutory definition of an HCLC under the TMLA. This decision underscored the importance of distinguishing between conduct tied to professional medical judgment and actions outside the scope of health care. Petitioner’s Arguments: Health Care Liability Claims Under the TMLA Dr. Leibman argues that the claims against him fall squarely within the TMLA framework. He argues: Scope of HCLCs : The letters were part of his medical care and treatment for Romano’s anxiety disorder, which inherently links the claims to health care standards. Safety Standards : The case involves safety standards under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which are tied to healthcare liability. Recasting of Claims : The Waldroups improperly framed their claims as general negligence to avoid the procedural requirements of the TMLA, including the expert report mandate. One of the cornerstone cases cited by the Petitioner is Texas West Oaks Hospital, LP v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2012) . This case was relied upon to argue that the TMLA’s broad definition of HCLCs encompasses claims involving safety standards, even if they do not directly arise from a patient-provider relationship. The Petitioner emphasized that, under Texas West Oaks , claims involving departures from safety standards integral to health care could qualify as HCLCs, aligning with his assertion that the service animal letters were tied to medical care and safety considerations. Respondents’ Arguments: Not A Health Care Liability The Waldroups argue that their claims are unrelated to health care and, therefore, fall outside the TMLA. They assert: No Medical Basis : The allegations concern Dr. Leibman’s representations about the dog’s qualifications, not his treatment of Romano. Non-Medical Conduct : Dr. Leibman acted beyond his professional qualifications by vouching for the dog’s status as a service animal without verifying its training or fitness. No Need for Expert Testimony : The claims involve straightforward negligence and fraud, which do not require expert testimony on medical standards. The Waldroups also argued that Dr. Leibman waived his assertions of HCLCs: Failure to Timely Disclose Legal Theory : The Respondents contended that Dr. Leibman failed to disclose his intention to classify the claims as HCLCs during earlier stages of litigation, including in his initial disclosures under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194.2(b)(3). This delay, they argued, deprived them of the opportunity to address the HCLC classification in a timely manner. Strategic Delay : They suggested that Dr. Leibman strategically delayed raising the HCLC argument until filing his motion to dismiss, which prejudiced their case and undermined procedural fairness. Impact on Procedural Fairness : The Respondents maintained that this delay conflicted with the legislative intent of the TMLA, which is designed to streamline the resolution of medical liability claims. They argued that Dr. Leibman’s conduct violated procedural fairness and their substantive due process rights. The Respondents heavily relied on Ross v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital, 462 S.W.3d 496 (Tex. 2015) , a key Texas Supreme Court case. In Ross , the court established that to qualify as an HCLC, the safety standard alleged to have been breached must have a substantive nexus to the provision of health care. The Waldroups argued that Dr. Leibman’s actions—issuing letters regarding the service animal—were unrelated to medical care or safety standards integral to health care. By applying the principles in Ross , they maintained that their claims did not fall within the TMLA’s framework. Petitioner’s Rebuttal to Procedural Concerns Dr. Leibman rebutted the claims that he failed to assert in a timely manner that Waldroup's claims were HCLCs under the TMLA. He argued: Timely Presentation of HCLC Argument : Dr. Leibman contended that his argument asserting the claims were HCLCs was raised in his motion to dismiss and supported in the subsequent post-hearing briefing. These filings articulated the applicability of the TMLA and the claims’ alignment with healthcare safety standards. Trial Court Consideration : He maintained that the trial court explicitly considered his motion, responses, and related arguments in its order denying dismissal, demonstrating that the argument was preserved for appellate review. Post-Hearing Clarifications : Dr. Leibman emphasized that he supplemented his position through additional filings to ensure that the court understood how the claims were tied to safety standards under the TMLA. Key Legal Issues Definition of HCLCs : Does a physician’s non-medical conduct, such as issuing letters about a service animal, fall within the scope of health care liability? Causation : Is there a sufficient causal link between Dr. Leibman’s actions and the child’s injuries? TMLA: The case may refine the statute’s applicability, particularly in cases involving third-party injuries. Implications of the Supreme Court’s Decision The Texas Supreme Court’s ruling will have far-reaching implications: For Physicians : It will clarify the boundary between medical judgment and actions unrelated to health care. For Plaintiffs : The decision could impact how claims against medical professionals are framed and litigated. Conclusion The case of Leibman v. Waldroup  presents a nuanced intersection of healthcare law, negligence, and statutory interpretation. Both sides have raised compelling arguments, leaving the Supreme Court of Texas to determine whether the claims are governed by the TMLA or fall outside its scope. As this decision unfolds, it will serve as a critical precedent in delineating the responsibilities and liabilities of medical professionals beyond the clinical setting. Stay tuned as we follow the developments in this important case.

As an insurance defense attorney in Texas, defending premises liability lawsuits can be challenging but rewarding work. These cases often involve complex legal principles and intricate details that require a deep understanding of both law and strategy. Here are some key insights and trends in defending premises liability claims. Understanding Premises Liability Premises liability refers to the responsibility of property owners and occupiers to maintain a safe environment for those who enter their property. In Texas, the injured party must prove that the property owner was negligent in maintaining the property, leading to their injury. This involves demonstrating that the owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition and failed to address it adequately. Key Defense Strategies 1.  Challenging Notice:  One of the most effective defenses is to challenge whether the property owner had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. This involves investigating the incident thoroughly to establish that the owner was unaware of the hazard or that it did not exist long enough to warrant action. Here are some Texas cases holding that the premises owner did not have notice:   Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece (2002) : The Texas Supreme Court held that Wal-Mart did not have constructive notice of a spill because there was no evidence indicating how long the spill had been present. The court emphasized the "time-notice rule," which requires temporal evidence to establish constructive notice. Albertsons, LLC v. Mohammadi (2024):  The court found that the placement of a leaking bag in a cart did not establish that Albertsons (premises owner) had constructive knowledge of water on the floor because there was no evidence that Albertsons’ had a policy or practice of leaving leaky bags in shopping carts or that Albertsons knew the problem routinely recurred. The court clarified the constructive and actual knowledge standards in premises liability cases.   2.  Open and Obvious Doctrine:  If the dangerous condition was open and obvious, the defense can argue that the injured party should have recognized the hazard and taken steps to avoid it. This doctrine can significantly limit the property owner's liability.   Austin v. Kroger (2024) : The Texas Supreme Court found that Kroger (premises owner) did not have notice of the dangerous condition because the spill was open and obvious. The plaintiff, Austin, was the employee responsible for mopping up the oily liquid that caused his fall. Since the spill was visible and Austin was aware of it, the court ruled that Kroger had no duty to warn him about the hazard. This decision underscores the principle that property owners are not required to warn the injured party about open, obvious, or known dangers.   3.  Comparative Fault:  Texas follows the comparative fault rule, which allows for the allocation of fault between the parties. The defense can proportionately reduce the property owner's liability by demonstrating that the plaintiff's actions contributed to their injury. 4.   Utilizing Surveillance Footage:  With the prevalence of surveillance cameras, obtaining video evidence can be a game-changer in defending premises liability cases. Video footage can provide a clear and objective account of the incident, potentially discrediting the plaintiff's version of events.    5.    Expert Testimony:  Engaging expert witnesses can be pivotal. Experts can testify about safety standards, the nature of the injury, and the cause of the accident. Their testimony can provide critical support to the defense's arguments. Emerging Trends Emphasis on Documentation:  Ensuring thorough and accurate documentation of the property conditions and maintenance activities is becoming increasingly important. Proper documentation can demonstrate that the property owner took reasonable steps to maintain safety. Technological Advances:  Technology such as 3D modeling and accident reconstruction software can enhance the defense's ability to present a compelling case. These tools can help illustrate the property conditions and the sequence of events leading to the incident. Spoliation of Evidence:  Defense attorneys are increasingly vigilant about preserving evidence. Failure to preserve critical evidence can result in spoliation claims, undermining the defense's position. Conclusion Defending premises liability lawsuits in Texas requires a strategic approach and a keen understanding of the law. Defense attorneys can effectively represent their clients and mitigate liability by focusing on challenging notice, leveraging the open and obvious doctrine, asserting comparative fault, and utilizing technological advancements. Staying abreast of emerging trends and best practices is essential for successful outcomes.   As the legal landscape evolves, insurance defense attorneys must adapt and innovate to provide the best possible defense for their clients. Don't hesitate to reach out if you have any questions or need assistance with a premises liability claim. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the firm, its clients, or any of its or their respective affiliates. This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

On June 6, 2025, the Texas Supreme Court issued a 5-4 opinion in Leibman v. Waldroup , No. 23-0317, a closely watched case testing the boundaries of the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA). At issue was whether a physician’s conduct—authoring letters for a former patient supporting the need for a service animal—constituted a “health care liability claim” (HCLC) subject to the procedural requirements of Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The Court said no. This ruling is significant. It clarifies the extent to which a physician’s actions, particularly those outside the traditional physician-patient setting, may be shielded under the TMLA. The case drew sharp lines between the majority and dissenting justices over the purpose and reach of the statute. Background: When Medicine Meets Misrepresentation Dr. Maurice Leibman, a gynecologist, provided two letters for his former patient, Jennifer Romano, attesting that she required a service animal to assist with generalized anxiety disorder. These letters were used by Romano to fraudulently obtain service animal credentials for her dog, Kingston. More than a year after her treatment with Dr. Leibman ended, Kingston attacked a child, R.W., in a Houston-area restaurant. The child’s parents sued Dr. Leibman, alleging negligence and fraud. Dr. Leibman responded with a motion to dismiss under the TMLA, arguing that the claims were HCLCs and should be dismissed due to the plaintiffs’ failure to serve an expert report within 120 days, as required by Section 74.351. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court affirmed. Dr. Leibman petitioned the Texas Supreme Court, arguing that his conduct—assessing Romano’s mental health condition and documenting the need for a service animal—was inextricably intertwined with the provision of medical care. The Supreme Court Majority Opinion: Attenuation and the Limits of the TMLA Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Hecht concluded that the Waldroups' claims did not fall under the TMLA. The Court emphasized that: Dr. Leibman’s conduct did not involve diagnosis, treatment, or professional medical judgment regarding Romano’s condition at the time the letters were issued; The letters were written well after the physician-patient relationship ended;   The harm (a dog bite to a third party) was too remote and attenuated from any act of medical care;   No expert medical testimony was necessary to assess whether Dr. Leibman acted reasonably in providing the letters. The Court cautioned that applying the TMLA to these facts would unreasonably extend its protections to non-clinical conduct with only tangential ties to health care. “To say that this is an HCLC is to stretch the Act beyond what its plain language supports,” Chief Justice Hecht wrote. The Dissent: A Warning Against Artful Pleading Justice Huddle, joined by Justices Devine, Young, and Bland, dissented sharply. She argued that the majority’s focus on the post-treatment timing and third-party injury ignored the TMLA’s broader scope. She emphasized that under Texas West Oaks Hospital v. Williams , the statute encompasses claims involving “safety” standards if they bear a substantive relationship to the provision of medical care. The dissent viewed Dr. Leibman’s conduct as a continuation of medical services: The letters were based on Dr. Leibman’s treatment of Romano for anxiety; The decision to endorse the need for a service animal required professional judgment;   Evaluating whether he acted within the standard of care would require expert testimony. Justice Huddle warned that the majority’s opinion invites plaintiffs to evade Chapter 74’s protections through creative pleading. “The Court allows an artfully pleaded claim to bypass the Legislature’s express requirements for HCLCs,” the dissent concluded. Key Takeaways: What This Decision Means Going Forward 1.     The Physician’s Role Alone Is Not Determinative Just because a physician authored the document at issue doesn’t make the resulting claim an HCLC. The context, timing, and nature of the act matter.   2.     Attenuation Matters Conduct occurring well after the treatment relationship has ended—and resulting in harm to third parties—may not qualify as related to health care.   3.     Expert Testimony as a Touchstone A central question remains whether expert testimony is necessary to evaluate the claim. If not, the claim likely falls outside the TMLA.   4.     Artful Pleading or Legitimate Classification? The dissent’s concern signals that future disputes will likely turn on how well plaintiffs craft their pleadings to avoid Chapter 74’s procedural hurdles.   Conclusion Leibman v. Waldroup marks a notable boundary-setting decision in Texas health care liability jurisprudence. While it provides clarity on the limits of Chapter 74, it also leaves room for future litigation over when a professional opinion—even outside the exam room—crosses the line into protected medical conduct. This case is a must-read for Texas litigators, health care providers, and insurers navigating the evolving contours of health care liability law.

A year ago, I bet on myself. I transitioned to Roerig, Oliveira & Fisher, LLP with one goal in mind: to start my own team and plant my own flag. Not just in title, not just in name, but in identity. In ownership. In direction. Starting something new always sounds exciting from the outside. Living it day-to-day is different. There were moments this year when I felt the weight of that decision. I felt the pressure of wanting to build something meaningful. I also felt a responsibility to represent clients at a high level. At some point, every professional faces the same internal question: Can I really do this the way I envision it? This year gave me that answer. Stretching in All the Right Ways This past year stretched me in the best ways. It challenged me professionally and forced me to grow strategically. One of the biggest highlights was getting back into marketing in a way I hadn’t done in a while. When you’re deep in litigation work, marketing can easily get pushed aside. But for me, it became part of the mission. Marketing forced clarity. It made me think intentionally about my message, my consistency, and what I want clients to feel when they place their trust in me. It was also refreshing to market in the context of being an insurance defense attorney, because in this world, credibility matters. Consistency matters. Relationships matter. Trust matters. Moment No. 1: “You’ve Made It Small” One of the most impactful moments of my year did not happen in a courtroom. It happened in a conversation. I met with a client who is also a friend. As we talked, we realized we had many mutual connections. I smiled and said, “Man, we live in a small world.” He responded with something I will never forget: “It’s not that the world is small. You’ve made it small.” That hit me. Because what he was really saying was that relationships do not just happen. They are built. Earned. Maintained. They require consistency, follow-through, and showing up over time. That statement will stay with me for a long time. It is also a reminder, as we enter 2026, that connection is not luck. It is intentional. Moment No. 2: Wins That Reminded Me Why We Fight This year also brought meaningful wins for clients, the kind that matter deeply. Some wins come through dismissal. Some come through a settlement that protects a client’s bottom line. Some come through preparation, paying off at precisely the right moment. Each of those outcomes embodies discipline, focus, and strategy. I am grateful for every client who has trusted me with the fight. Moment No. 3: Finding Rhythm Again At some point this year, something clicked. I found rhythm. The kind of rhythm that comes from being in the right place, surrounded by the right people, doing work that feels aligned with who you are and how you want to practice. I have joined a team of lawyers I genuinely respect. They are people I can count on, learn from, and stand shoulder to shoulder with when it matters. Talent matters, but team matters more. Having the right people around you makes the pressure lighter. It also makes the mission clearer. Looking Toward 2026 This year was not just about changing firms. It was about building identity, expanding capacity, and earning momentum. As I look ahead, I’m stepping into 2026 with new goals and bigger ambitions. I want to keep building the team, serving clients at a high level, growing the brand, and pushing myself to operate at an even higher standard. I am proud of what this past year represented. Growth. Resilience. Progress toward something I have been envisioning for a long time. Ever forward.

October 30, 2025 – Thirteenth Court of Appeals Issues Favorable Ruling in Chapter 74 Case Attorney Zeke Moya of Roerig, Oliveira & Fisher, LLP successfully represented a local hospital in both the trial court and on appeal, securing a full dismissal with prejudice in a slip-and-fall lawsuit after the Thirteenth Court of Appeals ruled the claim constituted a Health Care Liability Claim (HCLC) under Texas law. Case Overview The plaintiff, a patient referred for aquatic therapy, alleged she slipped on water in a locker room immediately after completing a therapy session at the hospital. She sued under a premises liability theory, asserting the hospital failed to maintain a safe condition. Zeke Moya, representing the hospital, moved to dismiss the case under Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, arguing that the claim was actually a health care liability claim requiring the plaintiff to serve an expert report. The trial court denied the motion—but the appellate court reversed. Key Findings by the Appellate Court In its October 30, 2025, opinion, the Court held that the plaintiff’s claim was inextricably linked to the delivery of health care. Applying the Ross v. St. Luke’s  framework, the Court emphasized: The plaintiff was a patient, not a visitor. The locker room was an extension of the therapeutic environment, not a general common area. The alleged unsafe condition (a wet floor) was a foreseeable risk inherent to aquatic therapy. The hospital’s duties in this context were professional safety standards, not general premises obligations. 📌 The Court explained: “The locker room, where patients shower and change after aquatic therapy, is indirectly related to the provision of health care.”  — Doctors Hosp. at Renaissance v. Corona , No. 13-25-00360-CV The result: Dismissal with prejudice and an award of attorneys’ fees and costs to the hospital under § 74.351(b). Why This Ruling Matters This decision reinforces that therapy-related claims involving patient care and treatment-specific areas must be evaluated through the lens of Chapter 74. Artful pleading does not control—substance prevails over labels. For health care providers across Texas, this case underscores the importance of asserting Chapter 74 defenses early, especially when post-treatment areas like therapy pools, showers, or locker rooms are involved. A Word from Lead Counsel “It was an honor to defend our client through every stage of this litigation,” said Zeke Moya, who handled the case from pre-suit through final appellate resolution. “The Court’s ruling affirms what we’ve argued from the start—claims tied to patient care, even outside the operating room, fall squarely within the protections of Chapter 74.”